

Social Integration
in the Post-Socialist Society:
The Case of Estonia

“The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe”
Working Papers edited by Prof. Dr. Bernd Henningsen

financed by the Fifth Framework Programme for Research
and Technological Development of the European Union

Volume 14
Ragne Kõuts (ed.)

Social Integration in the Post-Socialist Society:
The Case of Estonia

The content of this working paper is the sole responsibility of the author and does not reflect the European Community's opinion. The Community is not responsible for any use that might be made of data appearing in this publication.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

© 2004 by *BaltSeaNet*
Layout by *BaltSeaNet*
Typeset by *Kamil Smoliński*
Cover design by *Andrzej Taranek*
ISSN: 1642-865X

Ragne Kõuts (ed.)

Social Integration
in the Post-Socialist Society:
The Case of Estonia

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
Nordeuropa-Institut der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Gdańsk–Berlin 2004

Contens

1	Introduction	7
2	Background: Social and Economical Transformations in Estonia	9
3	Terms and Theory: Integration in the Modern Societies	14
4	Model for the Analysis of Social Integration	18
4.1	Vertical dimension of social integration	18
4.2	Horizontal dimension of the social integration	19
4.3	Ideal-types of social integration	21
5	Method and Data of the Empirical Study	24
5.1	Indicators of the vertical social integration	24
5.2	Indicators of the horizontal social integration	25
5.3	Ambivalent indicators of the social integration	26
6	Results of the Empirical Analysis	28
6.1	Vertical social integration: trust in the state institutions, political engagement, and attitudes	28
6.1.1	Trust in the state institutions	28
6.1.2	Political identification – clear view about processes in the society	29
6.1.3	Political engagement	30
6.1.4	Democracy and economic liberty: the attitudes towards freedom and commitment	31
6.2	Aspects between vertical and horizontal dimensions	32
6.2.1	Evaluation of the changes in the society	32
6.2.2	Participation in the civil society	35

6.3 Horizontal social integration: questions about trust and recognition	36
6.3.1 Trust as the most important force in the society	36
6.3.2 Social status of individual	38
6.4 Differently integrated groups in the empirical study	40
6.5 Socio-demographical characteristics influencing social integration	46
7 Conclusion and Discussion	48
Appendix	52
References	56

1 Introduction

Since the end of 1980s, when the changes in the former socialistic states began, the developments in these countries have been an exciting topic for sociology and political science (Huntington 1996, Offe 1994, Merkel 1999, etc.). With different goals the scholars have studied the transformation process, its reasons and consequences.

There we follow Wolfgang Merkel's definition of the terms "transformation" and "transition". The term "transformation" does not have a narrower meaning; it is a general term for all types of societal changes. It means also a change in regime, exchange of regime, change of system, and transition. At the same time, by "transition" only a change of state system from autocratic to democratic system is meant. (see Merkel 1999, 74–76).

In this paper, the focus is on the processes of social integration and disintegration (as the consequences of transition): how have the inhabitants of post-socialist states adapted to the new possibilities provided by the democratic system and market economy. In the article we will ask how are the inhabitants of Estonia connected with the state system and with other people residing in the state. This can often be problematic, as it seems that people have not adapted well to the quickly changed institutional context, with completely new rules of the game (in the democracy). The key words in the transition studies are lack of solidarity and "trust as a missing resource" (Sztompka 1995), political alienation of people (Fuchs and Roller and Weßels 2002), "post-socialist crisis" (Müller 1998), corruption and illegal economic activity, etc.

Other concepts often used in the context of the transition of the social system are those of "winners" and "losers". The former are the people who have managed to turn the changes in his/her own interests, the latter those for whom the changes have brought none or only few gratifications. Empirical studies have shown that the post-socialist societies tend to be highly stratified, without proper mechanisms for increasing social cohesion. In the beginning of the transition processes it was a "nationalizing ideology" that helped to find a common, unifying

goal; the building of a “nation-state of and for the core nation” (Brubaker 1998, 6). This idea is not unifying people anymore.

In the paper we shall try to analyse, what are the reasons behind people’s different levels of success in adaptation with the new situation. Based on an empirical example from the Estonian society, we shall try to give a more detailed analysis of the adaptation of different groups in a post-socialist society. Our aim is to show that not only individual’s relationships with the new system but also his or her relationship with other actors in the life-world are important factors for defining his/ her place in the society.

We start with an assumption that though with the transition to liberal economy and liberal state, the majority of people were the losers in respect to economic and social security, actually everybody has also won. For example, new possibilities have opened for everybody, e.g. to visit other countries, to participate in the decision-making processes, to declare openly his or her political and other views and choose his or her personal life course (new job, living-place, social abilities, etc.).

Based on earlier studies we claim that the adaptation to the new institutional context is not dependent only on the socio-demographical variables of individuals; rather it is “an active and participating life-orientation” that is “characteristic of a personality that influences social situation and attitudes of an individual” (Hion et al 1988, 80–84). However, in the course of our analysis we check if some socio-demographic properties are making the adaptation with the societal system and social context more complicated. Many social scientists have shown that the majority of “losers” tend to be elder people and people not having proper education for easily adapting to changed needs in the economical system (Estonian Human Development Report 1998, 17; Estonian Human Development Report 2003, 280).

For the analysis, to distinguish the groups with different levels of integration, we have constructed a theoretical model of social integration based on earlier studies and tested it on empirical data from a comprehensive survey. In the paper, the integration process is analysed on the micro level, i.e. via individuals and their attitudes, but we attempt to generalise the results for the whole society.

2 Background: Social and Economical Transformations in Estonia

Estonia has been an example case for a rapid transition in the economical and in the political field, or the so-called “chock therapy” (Merkel 1999; Offe 1996; Panagiotou 2001). In many others post-socialist states (e.g. Lithuania, Poland) the elites planned a milder transition, trying to give the people more time to get used with radically new social situation. In the transformation literature, there is a consensus over the view that “rapid economical reforms have a quite high social cost” (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 17) – unemployment, growing differences between people, poorness, frustration, and apathy.

The three Baltic States have taken a different tempo for the reforms – in Estonia, the changes have been quicker to some extent than in Latvia or Lithuania. Comparison between the three countries makes it evident that slower tempo has resulted in smaller social costs. For a comparison, we look at the changes in two social-economic indicators, the national product (GDP per capita) and the inequality (Gini) index.¹ The first indicator shows the “production power of the nation”, i.e. how successful has been the economic development of the country. The second index, however, measures the income differences between rich and poor people and could be interpreted as showing the “costs of transition”. (Table 1)

1 Gini index is an inequality measure. It measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequality. (Human Development Report).

Table 1. GDP per capita and Gini index in the Baltic countries, 1995–2001

	1995			2001		
	GDP per capita (in US dollars)	Gini index	Increase of Gini 1989–1995	GDP per capita (in US dollars)	Gini index	Increase of Gini 1995–2001
Estonia	2,425	39,6	11,9	3,635	37,6	-2,0
Latvia	1,769	31,0	8,5	3,013	32,4	1,4
Lithuania	1,622	36,0	8,5	3,039	36,3	0,3

Source: Baltic Media Book 2001; Human Development Reports, <http://www.undp.org>.

We can see that in 2001, the GDP per capita in Estonia is 3635 USD, only a little bit less than in Poland or Slovakia (Statistical Yearbooks 1995–2001). At the same time is there a considerably higher level of inequality between people. In fact, among the post-socialist countries not belonging to the CIS, Estonia has the highest Gini index value. In Estonia, where the changes occurred very rapidly in the beginning of the 1990s; both indicators – general domestic product and inequality have grown significantly during this time.

In Latvia, at the beginning of the reforms the GDP per capita was growing at a considerably lower pace than in Estonia, and is still lower, though catching up. The same has happened to the inequality indicator. This process is especially clear in the case of Lithuania.

The high inequality rates should not be seen as characteristic only to post-socialist societies. For example, the Gini indexes have an equal value in social-democratically oriented Germany and in liberal-economically oriented Estonia, and is even higher in the United States.²

² Many scholars have criticized the Gini index, because it gives the same value to the countries with obviously different inequality patterns. When we take into account how much different income groups get from the actual total income, Estonia would appear considerably more unequal than Germany, and only little bit more equal as the United States (Estonian Human Development Report 2003, 53).

We can claim that the ‘high’ inequality rate is not a real problem; the real problem is that the people of former socialist countries are not used to such levels of inequality; and it is more difficult for them to accept the differences in incomes and possibilities.

Some social and political scientists have labelled the transformations in Estonia as a “success story” (Panagiotou 2001; Rose 2000). It is clear that the state has made important steps towards more stable economical and political system (see in the Appendix a table of scores of democratisations, rule of law and economical freedom in different post-socialist countries).

Besides, at least during the first ten years of transition the reforms enjoyed strong support from the people (Rose 2000). In year 2000, 79 per cent of the Estonian population evaluated current economical system positively and 70 per cent considered new political system better than that of the Soviet period. Public support for the current political system has gradually increased. People’s hopes are even higher for the future; 92 per cent of the people think that the system will improve in next five years economically and 87 per cent believe that there will be further positive developments in the political system.

The reforms in Latvia or Lithuania have not gained similarly high level of popular support. Rather, one can detect a weak opposite tendency – in year 2000, 76 per cent of Latvians and 83 per cent of Lithuanians claimed that the Soviet economy had been better, and that they did not expect it to get better in near future. The support of the political system was a bit higher. However, in both countries the pessimistic opinions were dominant over positive.

Though there have been some negative aspects in the Estonian transformation process, people have remained supportive for the chosen path and have waited patiently for the better future. Because of such a rosy picture of Estonia as a little wonderland, for many politicians it was a surprise, when in 2001, in the public discussion talks started about a deep political crisis among the wider public (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002). In May 2001, public trust towards the political actors (prime minister, government, parliament, and president) sunk to its lowest level after gaining independence. (Figure 1)




Figure 1. Trust in the public institutions in Estonia; per cent of the population aged 15–74 answering that they completely or partly trust this institution
Source: Saar Poll.³

Definitely, a major initiator of this debate was a public memorandum by the Estonian social scientists in April 2001, in which they wrote: “in the Estonian society there is a political, social and ethical crisis. The political alienation of people is so deep that we should speak about two Estonias”. (Public memorandum of the Social Scientists 2001). They insisted on growing differences between political elite and “simple people”. As already said, there was no specific reason to talk of crisis at this particular moment.

At the same time there was no external cause for crisis: economic growth continued, human development indicators improved, and international recognition of Estonia’s success (primarily its suitability for

³ In the figure sticks out that in 2001 have the support to the political actors significantly decreased, but in 2002 reaches similar level as earlier. We can connect this curve directly with the occasions in politics and public life (public memorandum of social scientists in April 2001, which caused hot discussions about political alienation of people and growing economical inequality). At the end of the year was support to the government gone down and it was not possible to govern any more, the prime minister left and popular centrist party leader did the new coalition. Because after gaining independence it was first time for centrist party to make a government the people have had very much trust and a hope that new politics will be something else as earlier.

future membership in the EU and NATO) were confirmed. (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 18).

Lauristin and Vihalemm suppose that it was a normal shift in the societal development, it “can be interpreted as the start of new period /.../ and Estonia is joining the global processes of “normal” transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial society” (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 18). Other experts explain the crisis with deficient social integration:

The problem with Estonia’s development model – with its strong emphasis on competition – is the very large number of people who have been excluded from the normal processes of society.

(Estonian Human Development Report 2002, 110)

“Normal” processes in this context would mean the existence of a two-sided relationship between individuals and the state-system, where inhabitants of the state are supporting societal developments and are feeling themselves important for and not excluded from those processes, and where the state takes care of the people who need to be taken care of. For stronger social cohesion it is important that those people would not feel themselves much worse than “normal” people; that they could feel some solidarity with those groups.

3 Terms and Theory: Integration in the Modern Societies

The question “what holds societies together?” has been in the focus of the sociological discussions from their very beginning. Often, it has been explained through the notion “integration” (Habermas 1992; Peters 1993; Heitmeyer 1997; Münch 1998; etc.). Though with different focuses of study, all these theories represent “the view that far-reaching processes of disintegration proceed in the modern societies” (Fuchs 1999, 1). The phenomena of disintegration are seen in “unemployment, deficit of living places, poverty, fear and depression, everyday xenophobia and violence, crime, etc.” (Heitmeyer 1997, 9), that were considered as normal processes in a modern society until the end of 1980s.

A phenomenon like integration is not an easy subject to study empirically. The term is used often normatively and is understood differently by different authors. For example, Heitmeyer (1997) has given so extensive meaning to the term that it is possible to gather under this phenomenon almost all problems and conflicts rising from the society (Fuchs 1999, 2). Other scholars have similar difficulties with comprehensive argumentation when they try to define the term very broadly:

Social integration is such a state of a society, where all parts are strongly connected with each other, creating a whole, clearly bounded from outside; individuals to different parts as the members of society, families, social strata, groups, classes, unions, associations, and political parties. The societal subsystems fulfil particular functions as well – economy, politics, justice, science, medicine, mass media, or religion.

(Münch 1997, 66)⁴

4 Authors translations. Original in German: Soziale Integration ist ein Zustand der Gesellschaft, in dem alle ihre Teile fest miteinander verbunden sind und eine nach außen abgegrenzte Ganzheit bilden. Zu ihren Teilen gehören die einzelnen Individuen als Mitglieder der Gesellschaft, die Familien, Stände, Gruppen, Klassen, Schichten, Verbände, Vereinigungen und Parteien sowie die Teilsysteme, die auf die Erfüllung bestimmter Funktionen spezialisiert sind, so die Systeme der Wirtschaft, der Politik, des Rechts, der Wissenschaft, der Medizin, der Massenmedien oder der Religion. (Münch 1997, 66)

For empirical research, a very broad sociological concept like integration means many difficulties with finding measurable indicators from the real life, as well as with testing them. One solution to overcome the difficulties is to divide the term into different empirical parts, e.g. the distinction between system integration as the connections between societal subsystems, and the social integration, i.e. relations between individuals and social groups. (Lockwood 1964, Vogelgesang 2002, Weiß and Trebbe 2003)⁵

Whereas the problem of social integration focuses attention upon the orderly or conflict relationships between actors, the problem of system integration focuses on the orderly or conflict relationships between parts of a social system (Lockwood 1964, 245).

Thus, the system integration is a term describing the processes on the macro level, constituted by the social subsystems like economy, culture, politics, etc. At the same time, the social integration is used for intermediate and micro level relations. (Figure 2)

Social actors can have the relations not only with other actors on the micro level like family members, friends, colleagues; but they have likewise relations with actors on intermediate and macro level. Individuals need a way to communicate with the institutional context – they need to go to school to acquire skills for an effective existence in the complex society, they might need to go to the court to give a statement about a car accident, they need to register their place of residence, pay taxes, and so on. In very rough terms, they want something from state and the state wants something from them. Thus, two dimensions of the social integration can be distinguished:

5 There are a lot of possibilities to distinguish the integration dimensions. For example W. L. Kolb finds that at least four mutually linked dimensions should be singled out in the discussion of integration. These are: a) cultural integration, b) normative integration (the establishment of norms), c) social integration, i.e. the mechanisms of relating via sharing value orientations and achieving consensus, which make the declared norms actually work, and, d) integration at the level of direct cooperation, achieved via sharing of roles, coordination of activities, etc. (Kolb 1984).

horizontal and vertical social integration (Lockwood 1999; Friedland and McLeod, 1999).




Figure 2. The levels on integration and a research-perspective of the study⁶

This three-dimensional model has been suggested also by other authors, who have separated the system integration from the horizontal and from the vertical social integration (see Vogelgesang 2002; Weiß and Trebbe 2003, 401). In this paper we do not deal with the first type of integration, we only treat integration and disintegration in connection with the life-worlds of actors. Thus our approach analyses the micro level processes in the society.

In the empirical analysis, social scientists have stressed many different aspects and levels of social integration. Here we indicate few of them. Dieter Fuchs (1999) analyses social integration through the

⁶ Horizontal social integration could be hypothetically also the relationships between actors on the mediate level or vertical social integration the relationships between mediate and micro levels, but this levels are for current study irrelevant.

support for political institutions, conformity to norms, tolerance to others, and solidarity in society. Mishler and Rose (2001), as well as Delhey and Tobsch (2000) have considered trust in state institutions the most important factor indicating social integration. Delhey and Newton (2002) have added to that trust in other people. Vogelgesang (2002) concentrated his study on the life-world level and analyses values and social stereotypes as indicators of the social integration. In his, as well as in the study by Weiß and Trebbe (2003), attitudes towards the political system gain greatest importance.

In the current article we try to take different aspects into account and to study integration on both vertical and horizontal level. Social integration on the vertical level could be very roughly formulated as a type of relationship between an individual and a part of the state system. We can describe it with the adjectives active, supporting, interested, not interested, and apathetic, etc. On the horizontal level it is a type of relationship between an individual and other individuals or small groups – the relationships can be defined as for example trusting, cooperative, caring, responsible, or having the opposite qualities.

4 Model for the Analysis of Social Integration

Our aim in this chapter is to assess the possibility to empirically test the abstract dimensions of social integration. We are moving towards a less abstract model, where we try to synthesise different aspects of social integration studied by different scholars. At the beginning we shall construct a general model, not taking into account the specific characteristics of the post-socialist societies. In order to proceed, we separate the important aspects in two dimensions of the social integration: in vertical and in horizontal dimension.

4.1 Vertical dimension of social integration

Vertical social integration can be defined as the relationships between individuals and current societal system (in empirical terms, trust in and acceptance of the system). To “measure” this type of relationship, we should firstly define the most important actors mediating between individual members of the society and the state. Clearly, this role is carried out by organisations of civil society, political parties, and representative bodies like the parliament, the president, government and others. The next step is to ask what kind of relations individuals have with these actors: do people trust them, do people participate, and what do they think about these actors?

The mentioned actors and relations between constitute a complex web of vertical social integration, which is outlined schematically on figure 3.

On the level of state apparatus, we can ask how trustworthy are the state institutions for individuals? In their opinion, do the institutions fulfil their functions sufficiently? On the other hand, we can pose a question: how do the individuals evaluate societal transformations after fall of the Soviet system? Was the chosen path justified and has the actual change been similar to people’s expectations?

To questions of trust are important also in respect to the political parties, additionally it is possible to study the political orientations and

the level of political engagement of individuals. Do they find on the political landscape parties with sympathetic views? Have they written letters, voted on elections or participated in political demonstrations? Are they members of a political party, etc?




Figure 3. Mediating actors on the vertical level of the social integration between an individual and the system

In the sphere of civil society we can take into account all non-governmental bodies people belong to: private associations, unions of traders or artists, lobby-groups, associations of owners, etc. Empirically, we can measure the participation in these organisations only through the fact of belonging.

Finally, we analyse individuals' attitudes and values towards democracy and liberal economy.

4.2 Horizontal dimension of the social integration

Horizontal social integration shows the relationships of an individual with other actors in his or her life-world. The last consists of informal

ties and taken-for-granted knowledge that are supporting an individual in his actions in the everyday-world.

The sociological term “life-world” which describes relations on the micro level is derived from the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and is not very easily testable empirically. For example, Jürgen Habermas has defined it following: “life-world consists of the always trusted set of cultural knowledge”, where “non-problematic background assumptions, i.e. the values and norms which regulate social activity of the person” are saved (Habermas 1981: II, 191)⁷. This idea can be seen in the figure 4, where the pre-existing set of knowledge assigns the probable ties with other individuals and social groups. Of course, on the other side the society determines and modifies the set of knowledge.




Figure 4. Ties between individuals on the horizontal life-world level

As already mentioned, the empirical study of the different aspects of the life-world is not easy. It is possible to analyse the overlapping of some aspects in the life-world for a group of people; for example we can compare statements to the other people, a particular group of people.

There we can use standard questions about relationships with others from earlier studies: do the individuals generally trust other people? How do they feel themselves in their everyday-world? What place do

⁷ Author’s translations.

they consider themselves having in the eyes of other people? The total set of answers makes it possible to compare similarities and differences in the attitudes and values regulating everyday world of people.

4.3 Ideal-types of social integration

With the help of vertical and horizontal dimensions we construct a field of ideal types of integrated groups. In both dimensions it is hypothetically possible to be “very well integrated” indicated with a plus, or “not very well integrated” indicated with a minus (Figure 5). We place the ideal groups A, B, C, and D in this four-field schema.




Figure 5. Ideal types of the social integration

1) **Group “A”** is “very well integrated” in both dimensions, both with the state system and with other people and social groups. It means that the people belonging into this group are satisfied with the economical, political and cultural situation of the society and with their own position in the social system.

Within the group, however, there is one more possibility, which makes the interpretation of this variant difficult. We defined the individual’s relationship with the state system through his political activity

and attitudes towards the state system. But the activity can be clearly directed against the state, supplemented by a critical evaluation of the state system. This is also an active relationship with the state. In this case we should say that it is a case of “critical” vertical integration. A well-known example from history would be behaviour of intellectuals in the Weimar Republic in Germany.

Furthermore, we should make one more restriction in the type of relations with the state system. We should understand as political activity only legal activity; otherwise including all types of political activity would force us to say that, e.g. neo-nazist groupings are also “very well” integrated. In formal terms, they have strong social networks supporting them and are politically active, though outside the legal system. One aspect, though, would not allow the classification of neo-nazis as very well integrated – they are standing in confrontation with other groups and do not accept social diversity.

2) **Group “B”** is characterised by weaker connections with the political and economical system, but people belonging to this group enjoy highly supportive relations with friends, colleagues, family and other important groups in their everyday life. They are satisfied with their position within the groups and have good relations with groups not representing their views and attitudes. They accept different attitudes in the society.

But the question arises, why are they not vertically integrated? It is possible that participation on the institutional level is not so important for them. They might not have time or motivation to participate or they do not believe that their political activity would have an impact on politics. We can describe this group as politically apathetic. The clearest examples are the sub-cultures without political ambitions in the society. Their self-realisation is achieved through cultural activity and through strong cooperation with the people from their life-worlds.

3) **Group “C”** is not integrated on either dimensions. The people belonging into this group could be describe as not being able to build up for themselves the positive relations with the social system after the transitions. They are not satisfied with the current economical, political

and cultural situation; they can be politically critical, but it is likewise possible the feeling of powerlessness and thus they are rather apathetic politically. They do not have supporting relations with other people; they are standing alone without help and without or with only a small amount of recognition from others. These might be people without family or job or friends; these might be former activists, people who were loyal to the Soviet system, but who do not find support in the new society.

4) **Group “D”** has an interesting position in the matrix. The people belonging to this group are satisfied with the state system, but not integrated horizontally with other people and other groups. These could be young people who accept the rules of game in the society, but have not yet found recognition as opinion-leaders for other people. However, they are ambitious in both dimensions.

In the real life, we cannot find the four fields representing the ideal types of integration in their pure form. Discussions in mass media, as well as in scholarly literature have mostly dealt only with “++” or “--” groups, i.e. with the “winners” and the “losers”. But as we see, the model gives more possibilities to classify people.

5 Method and Data of the Empirical Study

In November 2002, a research group of the University of Tartu and the research company “Faktum” conducted a representative survey “Me, World and the Mass Media [Mina, maailm ja meedia].” Among other variables, the survey contains questions we need for “measuring” the social integration. The survey includes interviews with 1470 respondents aged 15–75 years. The questionnaire contains about 600 questions on media use, life-styles, political orientations, social values, individual socio-economical status and etc. The respondents filled out the larger part of the questionnaire personally; other questions were covered in a face-to-face interview by an interviewer. The next three parts will give an overview of the indicators used in current research.

5.1 Indicators of the vertical social integration

The vertical axe connects an individual with the system level: with state institutions, political parties, and organisations of civil society and market economy. For each of the categories, one or more indicators from the survey are used.

Firstly, the questions on trust towards the state institutions – government, parliament, president, police, and court system – are used as indicators of the people’s evaluation of the functioning of the state. In most general terms: do people think that the institutions are working, as they should? Of course, it is possible to argue that it very much depends on concrete political events and matters on the public agenda, and does not really show the general support for the state as such. However, previous studies have indicated that support of the institutions does not depend so strongly on little changes in everyday politics (Delhey and Tobsch 2000, 27).

Secondly, we will measure the political identification of an individual with the question “Do you find on the political landscape a political party with whose views you can identify?” The respondents could either choose one or more parties from the list, or answer that

they share the views of none of those. To understand the negative answers we can propose two explanations. It is possible that an individual is interested in politics but does not support existing parties. However, it is also probable that the decision not to identify oneself with any existing party is caused by recent political scandals or unpleasant politicians. This does not indicate that an individual is not interested in politics. Those persons most probably opted for another answer: "I am not interested in politics." Identification and non-identification are both important for the analysis, because they show different relationships with the important institutions standing as mediators between the state and society.

The third and perhaps the clearest indicator of the vertical relationship between an individual and the state is the index of political activity. Here we have summed up electoral turnout at parliamentary elections and participation in other political actions. The used survey questions are following: "Are you interested in domestic politics? Are you interested in foreign politics? Did you participate at the last elections? Have you done something else (written a letter, collected signatures, participated in demonstrations, etc.)?" The positive answers can reflect the person's belief that democracy is functioning in the state, and that individuals have impact on politics. At the same time, the reasons for negative answers can be more banal – e.g. the person does not have time or motivation to participate. Since it is important to distinguish between these reasons, the questions of interest are included. This way, apathetic persons will get smaller scores in the index than critically thinking, but rarely participating individuals.

Fourthly, we take into account people's attitudes towards the political and economical system generally, to construct a balanced picture of the vertical social integration. Here we include the statements on freedom and commitments in the framework of democracy.

5.2 Indicators of the horizontal social integration

Since we have defined horizontal level of integration as a type of relationship between an individual and other individuals or small groups, we focus on the statements about his attitudes towards different actors

in his life-world, toward other people in general, and his evaluation of his position in the society and in a social group.

Firstly, we can measure the level of horizontal social integration with the following question: “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?” The answers are related partly to the trustworthiness of societal history, partly to the person’s biography and character.

Secondly, his position within his most intimate groups is indicated by the question “Do other people ask your opinion, advice?” Be an opinion leader means a higher level of social capital, and also higher position in the community.

Thirdly, we have asked on which position he would place himself on a ten-step-ladder, with the first rank for the lowest group, for the people who are excluded from society, and the tenth rank for the highest group i.e. for the richest and most influential people in the society. It is possible that the respondents understood the staircase very differently, either that of an income or only that of authority, i.e. a hierarchy of owners of symbolic capital. However, we are arguing that independent of the personal perception of the basis of the ladder, it is a good indicate of the person’s subjective placing of himself in the society in comparison with other people (see Evans et al. 1992, 467).

5.3 Ambivalent indicators of the social integration

Finally, there are two important but ambiguous indicators in the survey that contain both dimensions of social integration.

Firstly, the evaluation of societal changes depends on both societal and personal situation. The respondents could interpret the success of societal transformations via individual success or failure. However, the statement “changes in the society have been rather positive or rather negative” can be understood also in more general terms.

Secondly, activity in different civil society organisations depends on the personal characteristics of the individual, the so-called “habitus”,

as well as on the image of such organisations in the society. In many post-socialist countries the acceptance of micro-level organisations is rather low because of the socialist past, when individual participation had only imaginary, but not real influence on politics.

6 Results of the Empirical Analysis

In this chapter, we focus on the most interesting empirical findings in respect to the above-mentioned questions. After that we indicate how people could be grouped on the basis of these questions – i.e. through different relationships with the state system and other people.

6.1 Vertical social integration: trust in the state institutions, political engagement, and attitudes

6.1.1 *Trust in the state institutions*

In the second chapter we indicated that in Estonia, the general trust in state institutions has remained high almost throughout the whole period of independence. The crisis of trust has become a scholarly topic only very recently.




Figure 6. Trust in the state institutions, November 2002

Our study shows that at the end of 2002 the inhabitants of Estonia has considerably more trust than distrust in the state institutions – i.e. government, parliament, president, police, and court system (Figure 6). Only one third of respondents trust the institutions little or very little; the vast majority consider their trust high or very high.

The people trust the highest the president, who has always enjoyed a very high level support from the Estonian people. The president has been seen as a representative symbol of an independent nation (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002). The other state institutions have lower levels of trust.

6.1.2 Political identification – clear view about processes in the society

The next aspect we analyse is the identification with the established political parties. One of the interesting questions here is the influence of political identification on the level of satisfaction with democracy and market economy. Can we say that the respondents with clear political views and identification are “better” connected with the societal system?

Wolling has claimed, based on empirical evidence, that individuals who identify themselves with an established political party are more satisfied with the state system than those who cannot or will not identify themselves (Wolling 2001, 32–33). But it is also important to analyse the differences in the attitudes of people who identify themselves with a ruling party from those who identify themselves with an opposition party.

In our study we saw a relation between the level of satisfaction with the societal changes and personal political identification. The figure 7 shows clearly that those who do not identify themselves with an established political party are more confused in the evaluation of the changes in the society (see Figure 7).

40 per cent of the respondents who do not identify themselves with any political party cannot give an evaluation to the transition of the

Estonian society. Among the respondents who have a clear identification, the per cent of confused people is only 12. From this it can be concluded that political identification fosters a clear view about processes in the society.




Figure 7. Connection between political identification and evaluation of changes in Estonia, correlation is statistically significant on the level 0,001.

6.1.3 Political engagement

The respondents, who are not interested in the domestic or foreign politics, or in the European Union, who do not participate in the elections, are labelled as apathetic respondents. We have constructed an index of apathy.

The index of apathy indicates that in our sample, around 20 per cent of respondents are apathetic to a certain degree, and about 37 per cent very apathetic. Less than half of people are not apathetic, they are more or less likely to actively state their opinion. We found that the political activity of the population is very low, though it is not surprising. Many studies show that political engagement depends on the socio-economical situation of the citizens and it increases during the

modernisation processes (Roller and Weßels 1998, 128; Welzel 2002, 297–298).

The next indicator is constituted by the attitudes towards democratic freedom and commitment. This explains additionally such a low level of political participation and lack of clear political views.

*6.1.4 Democracy and economic liberty:
the attitudes towards freedom and commitment*

This dimension explains how important see the respondents the activity of the nation-state and individual initiative in the society. To measure the social or liberal orientations of the respondents, we use the statements about democracy and liberal market economy from survey questionnaire.

When somebody says that an individual is principally an individualist and should take care of himself only, without help from the state, we have classified the person as liberally oriented. Contrary to this view is the positive identification with the statement that we need more solidarity in the society and that the state has the commitment to help weaker persons. The last view has been classified as the social orientation of the respondents. (see Table 2.)

Table 2. Agreement with the individualistic and collectivistic statements, per cent of the respondents who have chosen one or more of the statements

Social orientation	Liberal orientation
1. By nature, human beings are socially oriented and prefer to cooperate with other people.	By nature, human beings are individualistically oriented and are always in the state of war with other people.
2. It is not fair that the prosperity of an individual depends only on his personal abilities.	It is fair that the prosperity of an individual depends only on his personal abilities.
3. There should be more solidarity in the Estonian society.	There should be more individual responsibility in the Estonian society.
Index "Social orientation" = 62 %	Index "Liberal orientation" = 38%

The indexes show that the majority of respondents are socially oriented. The result could be understood as the counter-reaction to the very liberal orientation of the Estonian nation-state on the political level; people wish for more solidarity and more caring than there is in the society at the moment.

To some degree, however, the empirical result is surprising, as the public discourse in the Estonian print media strongly supports the liberal orientation-state (Kõuts 2002b, 68–70). When the view of the majority of the people departs from the one dominating in the mass media, it indicates that the public discussion is not open for everyone and the ideas of the non-elite do not have free access into the public arena.

6.2 Aspects between vertical and horizontal dimensions

In the questionnaire there are also some questions that respond to both dimensions of the social integration, i.e. evaluation of the changes in the society and participation in the organisations of civil society. Since these are important aspects, we cannot neglect them, but rather classify these in both dimensions in the empirical analysis.

6.2.1 *Evaluation of the changes in the society*

In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to give an evaluation to the changes in the society since the beginning of the 1990s. On one hand, the answers show support to the chosen path of the societal development, to democratic political system, liberal market economy, and not very socially oriented politics. On the other hand, we can interpret this as general trust towards the state system, that the respondents think that existing laws and political decisions are effective and good. But our analysis shows also that evaluations of the transformations are rather strongly related to the respondent's evaluations of changes in the personal life.

The study indicates that the majority of people evaluate the transformations in Estonia rather positively; only 23 per cent give a negative evaluation. Besides, there is a small group who does not know how they should evaluate the changes. (Table 3)

Table 3. Evaluations to the transformations last 10 years in different socio-demographic groups

Socio-demographic variables		N =	The societal transformations have been...		
			...rather positive (%)	I do not know (%)	...rather negative (%)
Total		1470	55	22	23
Mother tongue	Estonian	940	66	15	19
	Russian	509	35	35	30
Gender	Male	684	58	20	22
	Female	786	51	25	24
Age	15–19	148	60	30	10
	20–29	267	60	23	17
	30–44	397	54	23	23
	45–54	261	47	21	32
	55–64	213	53	21	26
Place of residence	65–74	184	57	21	22
	Capital city	453	64	17	19
	Bigger town	352	58	22	20
	Smaller town	276	55	27	18
Education	Country-side	324	58	17	25
	Below secondary level	326	50	30	20
	Secondary level	807	52	22	26
Occupation	High school	294	69	16	15
	Manual work	359	44	28	28
	Mental work	470	52	24	24
	Manual and mental work	473	65	18	17

RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Income per person (in Estonian kroons ⁸)	<1500	480	40	27	33
	1501–2500	406	53	24	23
	2500–4000	295	65	18	17
	4001–6000	154	75	16	9
	>6000	83	81	9	10

Source: University of Tartu, Nov. 2002. Author's calculations.

In the table we can see some important differences between socio-demographic groups in their evaluating of the changes. The societal changes are perceived more positively by Estonians, people with Estonian citizenship, younger respondents, those with higher educational level and respondents with higher income per person.⁹

However, if we analyse the evaluations of changes in different social spheres, we see that the people are of the opinion that all societal fields are not similarly developed. The respondents indicate to the spheres, which are changed rather positively for almost all respondents, and to the spheres, which almost all respondents evaluate rather critically. Already social scientist Claus Offe claimed that the “Dilemma of simultaneousness” in the post-socialist countries does not allow the balanced transformations on the all fields of society (Offe 1994).

In the opinion of the large public, different social spheres – economy, politics, culture and justice – have reached different levels of development (see average evaluations of the four fields in the figure 8).

The transformations have been evaluated as very positive by the respondents in the spheres of politics and democracy (including Estonian international position, functioning of democracy, human rights and freedoms in the nation-state). Almost an absolute majority has a high opinion of the functioning of democracy in Estonia.

⁸ 1 EUR = 15,647 EEK

⁹ All the differences are significant at the level of 0. 001 (One-way ANOVA Analysis).




Figure 8. Average evaluation to the changes in four spheres in the society, University of Tartu, November 2002

Similarly, the respondents have rather optimistic opinion of the cultural field; of the current state of Estonian national culture and language, and the achievements in the integration of minorities, as well as possibilities for education and self-realisation.

Also in economy, the developments are evaluated positively in many spheres, however, the respondents refer to brought problems on the labour market (high unemployment rates) and increased inequality, as in the public eye, not all Estonian inhabitants get their fair share of the welfare system and do not have equal consumption opportunities.

In the public opinion, the nation-state has even bigger problems with social justice and rights; the state system is socially unequal, and responsible institutions do not control the functioning of laws adequately. In this sphere, the majority of respondents are heavily critical, independent of their personal situation or status in the society.

6.2.2 *Participation in the civil society*

Several social scientists have claimed that many problems in the post-socialist societies come from the low level of personal initiative; the

civil society is not very strong in these countries and does not complement effectively the state system (Ruutsoo and Siisiäinen 1996, 30).

One of the most obvious explanations for such a situation is the legacy of the socialist past. In the socialistic state, individual initiative was almost obligatory; another way was not realistic to go up in the social hierarchy. The largest part of people were members of the trade union, participation in the sport or cultural was strongly recommended, etc. For example, most probably the fact that despite the almost 100%-membership in the trade unions during the Soviet periods, these were not effective,¹⁰ has devalued this institution in the eyes of Estonians, that has resulted in the low participation rates, very bad image and weak positions of trade unions in contemporary Estonia.

At the moment, people have not yet “learned” to protect their interests (Ruutsoo and Siisiäinen 1996, 34). The survey from November 2002 shows that less than half of the respondents belong to any civil society organisations. As such, all forms of non-governmental organisations were listed: organisations of owners or lodgers, cultural singing and dancing groups, trade unions, lobby-groups, specialised associations, etc. However, it seems that people are not very active at the vertical dimension of integration.

6.3 Horizontal social integration: questions about trust and recognition

This chapter deals with the horizontal social integration, with the topics of trust and recognition of other people. Additionally, we analyse the life-world through the self-perceived position or status of the individuals.

6.3.1 *Trust as the most important force in the society*

Already Georg Simmel (1950) gave great importance to the factor of trust in human cooperation. In the national societies, where it is impossible to be personally connected to everyone, trust is the key factor

¹⁰ Of course, the trade unions have had another function in the Soviet Union; the main aim was not to “protect” the interests of working-people.

in facilitating cooperation between people strange to each other. A good example of such cooperation is the trade system, where each participant wants to be sure that he get as much as he gives.

Sociologists claim that trust is created through experience (Hardin 1993).¹¹ For example, in the relationship between state system and an individual, if somebody has tried many times to overtly oppose the dominating politics and has been repressed as a result, not only this person will learn from the negative experience, but also others. It will be clear that alternative opinions are not accepted in that political system. A similar example can be drawn from commerce; when one person is trying to play a “fair play”, but is cheated over and over again, he finally adapts to dominating rules, if he wants to remain active in commerce.

Both trust and distrust reproduce itself through behavioural patterns of individuals. Robert Putnam (1993), e.g. has analysed the different levels of general trust in different regions in Italy; it is lower in the southern regions of Italy, where there is more corruption and crime, and higher in the safer North-Italy.

Thus, the survey question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?” can be interpreted as an evaluation of safeness or trustworthiness of social context (Putnam 2000, 138). In the comparison between the post-socialist and the western countries, it becomes clear that the people in East and Central Europe have fewer reasons to exhibit high levels of trust. During the soviet rule, trust was endowed only to small groups or communities. Richard Rose comments the results of the New Euro-barometer study:

East Europeans know those whom they trust, and trust those whom they know.
(Rose 1994, 29)

Likewise Piotr Sztompka has said that in the post-socialist countries “trust is a missing resource“ (Sztompka 1995, 256). The level of general

11 There we have also the social-psychological approaches where the authors connect the trust to others with development of personality and learning processes in the childhood, e. g. Erikson 1950, Allport 1961, Cattell 1965, Uslaner 1999, etc.

trust is lower in the post-socialist countries than in the stable western democracies.

Our study indicates that the respondents' experiences in the post-socialist Estonia have not given them a cause to think assess the social context as very trustworthy. 16 per cent of the respondents say that one should be very careful with other people, 55 per cent say that one should be rather careful, and only \bar{n} of the respondents think that one can trust other people.

This result is not in contradiction with the relatively high satisfaction rates with the societal changes analysed above. The type of trust we are dealing with here is the trust towards other people and is labelled as "generalised or social trust" (Rose 1994; Delhey and Newton 2002; Kaase 1999). At least empirically, there is no evidence of a correlation between trust on individual level and trust towards state institutions. Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton: „those who are satisfied with life are not necessary trusting, but those who are anxious are often distrustful“ (Delhey and Newton 2002, 20).

It is also interesting to test the correlation between general trust towards others and the position in the social system. It seems logical that people with higher status trust other people more as the individuals with lower status.

6.3.2 Social status of individual

We have chosen the micro level approach to the analysis of social integration, thus it is very important to take into account not only the "objective" indicators of integration like occupation or income, but to give importance also to the "subjective" factors, like the attitudes, ideas, fears, and feelings of the individuals. This is an approach shared e.g. by Delhey and Newton: "Subjective measures of success and well-being (life satisfaction, satisfaction with standard of living, low anxiety) do better than objective ones (standard of living, occupation, and income)." (Delhey and Newton 2002, 20) Thus, we suppose that in the actual social integration, the feeling of being socially integrated plays the main role.

We take as a part of social integration the self-positioning of individual in the social hierarchy. On one hand, this positioning is an evaluation of personal abilities, success, or “capital”; on the other, everyone needs a referential context to define his place in the social hierarchy. Evans, who has studied social stratification in Hungary and Australia, has written: “for deciding, where one belongs, one needs to compare his social situation with that of others” (Evans et al. 1992, 479). Thus, with the question “Where do you belong?” we examine concurrently an individual and the society he belongs to.

To show the perception of changes in the social hierarchy we asked in the survey about one’s social position today and 20 years ago. It seems that for the respondents today’s society is more elitist than earlier; there we have a small elite, broad middle strata and a small lower stratum. Retrospectively, the respondents perceive the socialistic society very different, the lowest strata did not existed, and more people had higher status, and belonged to the higher middle stratum. (Figure 9)




Figure 9. Evaluation of personal status in the social hierarchy today and 20 years ago, November 2002¹²

12 The Graphs have the next statistical values: today mean 4,9 pt, median 5 pt, percentiles 4 pt, 5pt, and 6 pt; 20 years ago mean 5,4 pt, median 6 pt and percentiles 5 pt, 6 pt and 7 pt.

Similar, but not so optimistic results can be found in Iris Pettai's study from 2001. In her study, only 10 per cent of the respondents placed themselves to the highest stratum (scale points 7, 8, 9, and 10) and 31 per cent to the lowest position (scale points 1, 2, and 3) (Pettai 2002, 123). For the respondents, the society was more equal twenty years ago.

On the figure 9 we see that of the majority of people say that their social position has changed during the transformation period. This brings us the questions "Do we have the 'winners' and 'losers' in the society, and who are they?" Around 17 per cent of the respondents evaluate his position today significantly lower than before (change in the hierarchy downwards three or more points), about 29 per cent a little bit lower (one or two points downwards), similarly big group does not see changes in their personal status, and one fourth of the respondents say that they have now a better position in the society.

The question "Does the other people ask oft for your opinion?" can be used as another indicator of relations with other people. Of course, the answer is highly subjective, but gives us a particular picture of people who consider themselves opinion leaders in the social groups.

The data indicate that almost everyone is an opinion leader in some context. More as a half of the respondents say that the family members, friends and colleagues ask for their opinion or advice rather often. Only 1/10 thinks that the others do it rather seldom.

6.4 Differently integrated groups in the empirical study

We take the above-described indicators together with a method that groups the respondents with different types of relationships with the state system and with other people into different groups or clusters. The classification of people is possible with the cluster analysis. In the table 4 we have summarised the variables used for the empirical analysis. (Table 4)

Table 4. The variables included in the cluster analysis

Variables	Scale
1. Evaluation of societal changes	1–3 (negative)
2. Trust in the state institutions	1–25 (very high)
3. Generalized trust	1–5 (very low)
4. Identification with a political party	0; 1 (no, yes)
5. Political engagement	1–8 (very high)
6. Participation in the organisations of civil society	Total
7. Liberal orientation	1–6 (very high)
8. To be an opinion leader	1–5 (never)
9. Position in the social strata	1–10 (very high)
10. Changes in the social strata with last 20 years	-9...+9 (better)

Since we have more than one thousand cases, we have used the K-Means cluster analysis method. With this method, it is necessary to choose the number of clusters. For doing that we first made a random sample of cases and used the hierarchical cluster analysis to find the best number of clusters based on Elbow criterion¹³.

This criterion showed that optimal number of clusters is six. If we tried to group the respondents in more clusters, we would get some groups, which were not significantly different from each other; if we made fewer groups, people who are actually very different, could be amassed together. In the six groups solution, the respondents in different groups are clearly different from each other in some aspects, thus we can say that they represent different types of the social integration¹⁴.

13 Elbow criterion brings up statistical coefficients in every steps of classifying the cases. The abrupt increase in the value of the coefficient indicates to the number of clusters, where it makes no more sense to classify the cases into smaller units. To Elbow criterion view Backhaus et al 1990.

14 The socio-demographic variables to the clusters view in the appendix.

Table 5. Differently integrated groups in the study*

	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3	Type 4	Type 5	Type 6	Total
<i>1. Horizontal integration</i>							
Generalized trust	+	+	-	-	-	-	∅
To be an opinion leader	+	+	+	-	-	-	∅
Position in the social strata	+	∅	+	∅	∅	∅	∅
<i>2. Horizontal/vertical integration</i>							
Evaluation of societal changes	+	+	+	-	-	-	∅
Participation in organisations	++	++	-	-	-	∅	∅
<i>3. Vertical integration</i>							
Identification with a political party	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	-	∅
Political engagement	+	+	∅	∅	∅	-	∅
Trust in the state institutions	∅	++	+	++	∅	--	∅
Liberal orientation	+	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅
Per cent of respondents	4%	7%	24%	19%	32%	14%	100%

*The marks in the columns indicate that a group has in this dimensions in comparison to other groups: -- much lower value; - bit lower value; ∅ average value; + bit higher value; ++ much higher value.

1) The first group (271 respondents) differs from other groups clearly in three aspects: the members of this have more trust towards the state institutions; they are less integrated on the horizontal level; and they evaluate societal changes less positively than the other groups. We can say that these people show very little individual initiative in cooperation with other social actors, but they hope that the nation-state fulfils its main tasks. Thus we label them as a **group passively adapted to the new situation**. They do not trust other people very much, they are not opinion leaders in social groups and they place themselves to the middle

stratum in the social hierarchy. However, their social position has decreased to some degree during the transformation years. In this passive and trusting group, there are more rural people, elder people and people with less education.

2) The second group is the smallest (53 respondents) but very interesting. We can label them as the **group of activists** who participate enthusiastically in politics and in different civil society organisations, and who have a broad and supporting network of social ties with other people. Only this group is clearly liberally oriented, evaluating highly individual activity. They show high level of trust towards other people and moderate trust in state institutions; probably are they critical towards politic, but try to find ways to improve things.

As for the socio-demographical properties of the respondents belonging to the second type, we do not find any variable that determines this active life-style and attitudes. We can only say that individual initiative and active life-style is the most important feature of character that these people share. They are integrated both on the vertical and on the horizontal level.

3) The people in the third group (208 respondents) have not adapted well to the new democratic nation-state. Since they have fewer values in almost all dimension of social integration, we label them as the **not integrated group**. They have significantly less trust in state institutions, they do not identify themselves with a political party, they are politically apathetic, and they evaluate the transformations in the society rather negatively.

This group is mainly made up of Russians residing in Estonia, the majority of whom are the citizens of the Russian Federation or are stateless. Thus it is clear that they do not have strong connection to the nation-state where they live. Mostly they are the people with the smallest income (less as 1500 kroons per person) and they perceive their social position to have degraded during the transformations.

4) The fourth group is the biggest (470 respondents) and shares similarities with the third group, only with a difference that they have a stronger connection with the state system. They are not participating in the organisations of civil society and do not evaluate changes in the society very positively, but they find on the political landscape at least one party with sympathetic views. Similarly to the vast majority of all respondents, they are not especially active in the political field. But we label them as the **not especially active group**. The share of Russians in this group is a bit over average, as for other socio-demographic variables, the group consists of all different types of people. Only one aspect is characteristic to this group – their personal income is lower than average.

5) The fifth group (357 respondents) is the **group focused mainly on the activity in the life-world**. They declare that other people ask often for their opinion, they evaluate their own position in the social strata higher than other groups, they think that societal changes during the last ten years have been rather positive, and that the state institutions are doing the right things. However, they do not participate actively in the organisations of the civil society or in politics; they are rather passive and use the institutional context for their own interests. Since to this group belong more younger people and more people with higher incomes, we can suppose that they do not have time and motivation for being active at the institutional level of the society. Probably are they oriented towards the self-realisation and individual wealth. It is the only group where the majority placed themselves now higher in the social strata than before. This is probably dependent on the age of this group – 20 years ago they were still children and depended on their parents' social status.

6) The sixth group is again small (103 respondents) and significantly different from other groups. It is the other group that is very well integrated vertically. Additionally, this group has strong ties on the life-world level. Thus they are integrated with the state system and with other groups. Despite the fact that the respondents in this group say that they have gone a little bit down in the social hierarchy, they do not find the changes in the society negative. They evaluate the changes in the society positively and trust state institutions; they are also politically and socially active. They have strong symbolic position as opinion leaders in small groups and they trust other people more than other groups. In

socio-demographical terms, the respondents in this group have mainly higher level of education, and their occupations include both mental and manual aspects. Thus we label the last **group active intellectuals**, well-adapted both to the system and other people.

It is however surprising, that the respondents in this active, well-integrated group say that they have at the moment lower social status than in the socialist society. Perhaps this could be explained by the paradox in the position of intellectuals in socialist Estonia. In Estonia, they have had very high level of cultural and symbolic capital; now some of them have not succeeded in translating those forms of capital into new forms needed in the liberal democratic society. In present day Estonia, the economic and social capital are considerably more important for successful action in the society (Kruusvall 2002, 158–161).




Figure 10. Positions of differently adapted groups in the integration schema

Now we come back to the theoretical schema and place the empirical groups at the graph. As the cluster analysis revealed, it makes sense to describe the relations of the respondents with the institutional context and with other people with opposite adjectives “active” vs. “passive”. We sum up the different values (pluses and minuses in the table 5) in the different spheres and get the schema of social integrated groups in the Estonian society. (Figure 10)

We see that the graphic follows the idea in the four-field-model that real groups in the society acquire different positions on the vertically opposite fields of the “winners” and “losers”. The discussions have been somewhat justified. To make an assumption, why the groups have such positions we proceed with a more detailed analysis of the socio-demographical characteristics of the groups.

6.5 Socio-demographical characteristics influencing social integration

At the beginning of the article we laid out a hypothesis that social integration is mainly an indication of the properties of a personality. Social integration depends on the personality type which leads to active lifestyle; only some socio-demographical factors have influence on the adaptive skills of the particular groups, and these are mainly negative. We can say that some socio-demographical variables do not foster social integration, but they can constitute a barrier.

The regression analysis with clusters and socio-demographic variables shows that this supposition was correct. There are two socio-demographic variables, education and age, that determine to some extent belonging to one or another group. But only in 40 per cent of the cases, we can say how well a respondent is integrated, knowing his age or the educational level. None of the other socio-demographic variables has significant influence over the level of integration.

Thus we can suppose that the constant in the regression model could be an influencing factor of the personality, but it could be as well anything others.

Table 6. Socio-demographic variables in a regression model

Variable	R Square	Beta
(Constant)	0,40	0,294
Age		-0,103
Education		0,099
Citizenship		
Occupation		
Mother tongue		
Income pro person		
Living-place		

In the table are only significant values $p < 0,01$.

7 Conclusion and Discussion

In the paper we have once again entered the discussion over the “winners” and “losers” in the post-communist society. We have analysed these terms through the concept of social integration and showed that it makes sense to distinguish social integration into two axes. The vertical integration dimension shows the relationship of an individual to the new democratic and economic system; the horizontal dimension of social integration indicates person’s relations with other micro-level actors in his life-world. Since we analysed mainly the feeling to be or not be integrated, we have taken micro-level approach – integration as a socially constructed phenomenon.

By analysing some indicators representing social integration we found that it is typical in Estonia to evaluate the transition of the society from socialist to the democratic system rather positively, but that problems are perceived in particular fields, for example in the sphere of social justice and social rights, as well as labour market.

We have shown that people do not maintain significant levels of distrust towards state institutions; in general they have positive opinion of the work done by the parliament, president and government. But most of the people hope for more a socially oriented approach in contemporary Estonia; the individualistic and liberal views, which dominate in the public discourse, do not find equal support from lay people.

We have seen that people are politically active to some extent; and that clearer political identification of a person is in positive correlation with clearer standpoints in the question if the societal changes have been positive or negative. However, very few people show individual initiative to personally influence the political processes.

On the everyday level, people are rather distrusting, the majority holds the view that one should be careful with other people. They trust mainly their most intimate groups because the social context has often

been insecure for them and has force them towards rather careful position in interactions with others.

We have made two assumptions of the character of social integration. Firstly, that there is a group of people in the society, who by personality type are more active in the society and make active use of the particular social conditions for self-realisation, and though this also contribute to the development of the society. The transition to the democratic state system gave them a possibility to use the newly emerged freedom of action participation. We supposed that they are the most active takers and givers in the social relations, and that it is not possible to determine this integration type through people's socio-democratic variables.

Secondly, we tested the question, if there is a group in the Estonian society, whose lack of success in social integration could be traced to some particular socio-demographic variables, which could be defined as barriers to the social integration.

To control those assumptions, we constructed an empirical model of social integration on the micro level of social actors. With the help of cluster analysis we classified the respondents of a representative empirical survey in Estonia. Additionally, we tested if any socio-demographic variables determined the respondent's belonging to a particular group.

With the cluster analysis, we distinguished between six groups with different relationships with the state system and with other people in everyday context. The relationships have been described in the active-passive dimension. We distinguished two small groups that are very active on the state, one that is moderately active and three passive groups. Especially the group consisting of mainly Russians, lack positively defined relations with the institutional structure of the new nation-state. After Estonia gained independence, many Russians have lost their former privileged position in the state and society and they have not been able to adapt to the new institutional context. On the everyday level, their life-worlds probably differ from those of Estonians to a large extent.

But it is not a case for all Russians in Estonia. The analysis shows that local Russians are with Estonians more similar as the Estonians

think. It is, like the Russians themselves say: “In Russia we are Estonians, in Estonia we are Russians”. One could see it among other factors as the influence of the state program “Integration of the Estonian Society 2000–2007”.¹⁶ Sociologist Jüri Kruusvall indicates to the outcomes of the processes in the inter-ethnic relations:

Social, economic, political and cultural forms of capital are unequally distributed, not so much between Estonians and non-Estonians, but between different subgroups both within the Estonian and the non-Estonian communities.

(Kruusvall 2002, 161)

The regression analysis showed that the ethnic belonging and citizenship are not the main factors influencing belonging to a particular group. Rather, the determinate socio-demographic indicators are age and education. It is certainly easier for the younger people to take the “new” democratic rules of the game as normal. On the other hand, higher level of education indicates the ability of the individual to use all his personal resources for adapting to the new conditions.

However, age and education are not the only and the most important factors, determining the level of social integration. We supposed that social integration is very much dependent on the personality type which leads to more active life-style, and thus creates more active relationship with the new democratic system and with other people. We saw also that the active group consists of people with very different socio-demographic characteristics.

Thus we conclude, that in Estonia there exists a small group of people who would strive for self-realisation in any societal conditions. These people are not characterised by any specific socio-demographic variables, but by a particular personality type. On the other side, the social transition has created a situation, where some socio-demographical variables

16 The research-project „Media Monitoring of Integration of Russian-speaking Population“ concludes: „National integration program and the undertakings within it, e. g. media campaigns on integration, have helped to encourage public discussion and make media coverage more critical and reflexive, leading to the questions about identity of Estonians.” (Kõuts 2002a, 59–60).

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

function as barriers for successful social integration. Clearly, people with lower level of education have fewer possibilities, as in a very quickly changing society, flexibility is needed, which is characteristic to people with better education. Secondly, the younger people are more able to adapt to the new rules of game. And thirdly, more difficulties with integration can be observed among Russian-speakers.

In normative terms, if the goal is greater cohesion in the society, the two factors that should get highest attention are education that provides people better possibilities on the labour market, and the integration of minorities.

Appendix

Table 1. Cross tabulation of socio-demographic variables and clusters, per cent in the population and in the clusters

		Population by... (%)*	Per cent in each cluster					
			1	2	3	4	5	6
Age	15–19	10	7	15	10	5	13	7
	20–29	18	20	22	15	19	17	20
	30–44	27	25	33	22	32	19	25
	45–54	18	17	11	17	16	26	17
	55–64	14	16	10	17	16	13	16
	65–74	13	15	8	19	11	11	15
Place of residence	Capital city	30	35	28	28	31	30	36
	Bigger town	20	16	19	13	19	9	29
	Smaller town	20	21	22	21	20	26	21
	Country-side	30	28	31	38	29	34	14
Education	Below secondary	[20]	10	24	31	17	9	25
	Secondary	[58]	47	52	50	60	58	60
	High school	[22]	42	22	15	19	28	14
Occupation	Manual work	[27]	13	19	28	27	9	31
	Mental work	[31]	28	31	32	34	21	33
	Manual and mental work	[42]	51	41	25	28	28	23
Income per person	< 1500	[34]	24	25	33	39	8	43
	1501–2500	[27]	25	23	30	30	43	24
	2501–4000	[22]	23	22	21	18	28	17
	4001–6000	[11]	19	17	12	5	9	6
	> 6000	[6]	6	10	3	4	11	4
Mother tongue	Estonian	66	82	77	73	60	77	35
	Russian	34	18	23	26	40	21	61

APPENDIX

Citizenship	Estonian	80	96	91	86	81	91	59
	Russian Federation	6	2	3	5	9	2	18
	Other	1	0	1	0	1	4	4
	Without citizenship	13	2	4	8	9	4	19

* – Values in the brackets are calculations of the author based on the Population and Housing Census 2000 of Estonian Statistical Office. Other values are derived from Estonian Statistical Office 01.01.2002.

Table 2. Nations in Transit 2001 ratings for democratisation, rule of law and economic liberalisation in post-communist countries

Ratings and scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 representing the lowest level of democratic development. The 2001 scores and ratings reflect the period 1 July 1999 through 31 October 2000.

Central Europe	PP	CS	IM	GPA	Democratisation	CLIF	CO	Rule of Law	PR	MA	MI	Economic liberalisation
Czech Republic	1.75	1.50	2.00	2.00	1.81	2.50	3.75	3.13	1.75	2.25	2.00	2.00
Hungary	1.25	1.25	2.25	3.00	1.94	2.00	3.00	2.50	1.50	2.25	2.00	1.92
Poland	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.75	1.44	1.50	2.25	1.88	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.67
Slovakia	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.75	2.25	2.25	3.75	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.50	3.25
Slovenia	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.50	1.94	1.50	2.00	1.75	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.08
Balkans												
Albania	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.13	4.50	5.50	5.00	3.75	4.50	4.25	4.17
Bosnia	4.75	4.50	4.50	6.00	4.94	5.50	5.75	5.63	5.00	5.50	6.00	5.50
Bulgaria	2.00	3.50	3.25	3.50	3.06	3.50	4.75	4.13	3.50	3.25	3.75	3.50
Croatia	3.25	2.75	3.50	3.50	3.25	3.75	4.50	4.13	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.58
Macedonia	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.25	5.00	4.38	4.00	4.75	5.00	4.58
Romania	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.75	3.31	4.25	4.50	4.38	3.75	3.75	4.50	4.00
Yugoslavia	4.75	4.00	4.50	5.25	4.63	5.50	6.25	5.88	5.00	5.50	5.50	5.33

Baltics												
Estonia	1.75	2.25	1.75	2.25	2.00	2.75	2.38	1.75	2.00	2.00	1.92	
Latvia	1.75	2.00	1.75	2.25	1.94	3.50	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	
Lithuania	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.50	1.94	3.75	2.75	2.50	3.00	2.75	2.75	
CIS												
Armenia	5.50	3.50	4.75	4.50	4.56	5.75	5.38	3.25	3.50	4.00	3.58	
Azerbaijan	5.75	4.50	5.75	6.25	5.56	6.25	5.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	4.92	
Belarus	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.25	6.56	5.25	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.25	
Georgia	4.50	4.00	3.50	4.75	4.19	4.00	4.63	3.25	4.00	4.00	3.75	
Kazakhstan	6.25	5.00	6.00	5.00	5.56	5.75	6.25	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.50	
Kyrgyzstan	5.75	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.13	5.25	6.00	4.50	3.75	3.75	4.00	
Moldova	3.25	3.75	4.25	4.50	3.94	4.00	6.00	3.50	4.25	4.25	4.00	
Russia	4.25	4.00	5.25	5.00	4.63	4.50	6.25	3.75	4.25	4.50	4.17	
Tajikistan	5.25	5.00	5.50	6.00	5.44	5.75	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.25	5.50	
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.75	6.94	7.00	6.25	6.75	6.25	6.50	6.50	
Ukraine	4.00	3.75	5.25	4.75	4.44	4.50	6.00	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.33	
Uzbekistan	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.00	6.50	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.17	

Democratisation score – average of political process (PP), civil society (CS), independent media (IM), and governance and public administration (GPA) ratings.

Rule of law score – average of constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework (CLIF) and corruption (CO) ratings.

Economic liberalisation score – average of privatisation (PR), macroeconomic policy (MA), and microeconomic policy (MI) ratings.

Source: Karamycky, Moryl & Schnetser 2001.

References

- Backhaus, Klaus, et al.: *Multivariate Analysemethoden*. Berlin, 1990.
- Beck, Ulrich (ed.): *Politik der Globalisierung*. Frankfurt a. M., 1998.
- Delhey, Jan, and Kenneth Newton: *Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Nations*. Discussion Paper FS III 02–402. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2002.
- Delhey, Jan, and Verena Tobsch: *Understanding Regime Support in New Democracies*. Discussion Paper FS III 00–403. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2000.
- Emor: *Baltic Media Book 2001*. Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, 2002.
- Estonian Statistical Office: *Statistical Yearbooks of Estonia*. Tallinn, 1995–2001.
- Estonian Statistical Office: *Population and Housing Census 2000*. 2001, 12 Jan. 2004. <<http://www.stat.ee/section=67811>>.
- Evans, M. D. R., et al.: “Images of Class: Public Perceptions in Hungary and Australia.” In: *American Sociological Review* 57(1992: 4), 461ff.
- Friedland, Lewis A., and Jack M. McLeod: “Community Integration and Mass Media: A Reconsideration.” In: David Demers (ed.): *Mass media, social control and social change: a macro-sociological perspective*. Ames, Iowa, 1999, 197ff.
- Friedrichs, Jürgen, and Wolfgang Jagodzinski: „Theorien sozialer Integration.” In: Jürgen Friedrichs, and Wolfgang Jagodzinski (eds.): *Soziale Integration*. Sonderheft 39 der *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*. Wiesbaden, 1999, 9ff.
- Fuchs, Dieter: *Soziale Integration und politische Institutionen in modernen Gesellschaften*. Discussion Paper FS III 99–203. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 1999.
- Fuchs, Dieter, et al. (ed.): *Bürger und Demokratie in Ost und West*. Wiesbaden, 2002.

Gould, J. and W. L. Kolb (eds.): *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*. New York, 1984.

Habermas, Jürgen: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. 2 vols. Frankfurt a. M., 1981.

Fuchs, Dieter: *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats*. Frankfurt a. M., 1992.

Hardin, Russell: "The street-level epistemology of trust". In: *Politics and Society* 21(1993: 6), 505ff.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (ed.): *Was hält die Gesellschaft zusammen?* Frankfurt a.M., 1997.

Hion, Ene, et al.: *Meie muutuiv elulaad. [Life-styles in contemporary Estonia]*. Tallinn, 1988.

Huntington, Samuel P.: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, 1996.

Kaase, Max: "Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalised political participation in Western Europe". In: *West European Politics* 22(1999:3), 1ff.

Karatnycky, A., et al. (eds.): *Nations in Transit 2001: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States*. New Brunswick, 2001.

Kruusvall, Jüri: "Social Perception and Individual Resources of the Integration Process." In: Marju Lauristin, and Mati Heidmets (eds.): *The Challenge of the Russian Minority: Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia*. Tartu, 2002, 117ff.

Kõuts, Ragne (ed.): *Estonian Press about Integration: Media Monitoring of Integration of Russian-speaking Population 1999–2001*. Tartu, 2002a.

-----: *Riikluse tõlgendusmallid Eesti ajakirjanduses enamuse-vähemuse suhete taustal. [Ideas about the nation and the state in the Estonian print-media]*. Master thesis, Tartu, 2002b.

- Latvian Statistical Office: *Statistical Yearbooks of Latvia*. Riga, 1995–2001.
- Lauristin, Marju, and Peeter Vihalemm: “The Transformation of Estonian Society and Media: 1987–2001”. In: Vihalemm, Peeter (ed.): *Baltic Media in Transition*. Tartu, 2002, 17ff.
- Lithuanian Statistical Office: *Statistical Yearbooks of Lithuania*. Vilnius, 1995–2001.
- Lockwood, David: “Social integration and system integration.” In: George K. Zollschan, and Walter Hirsch (eds.): *Explorations in Social Change*. London, 1964, 244ff.
- Lockwood, David: “Civic integration and social cohesion.” In: Ian Gough, and Gunnar Olofsson (eds.): *Capitalism and Social Cohesion*. Houndmills, 1999, 63ff.
- Merkel, Wolfgang: *Systemtransformation*. Opladen, 1999.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose: “What are the Origins of Political Trust?” In: *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(2001:1), 30ff.
- Müller, Klaus (ed.): *Postsozialistische Krisen*. Opladen, 1998.
- Münch, Richard: „Elemente einer Theorie der Integration moderner Gesellschaften.” In: Wilhelm Heitmeyer (ed.): *Was hält die Gesellschaft zusammen?* Frankfurt a. M., 1997, 66ff..
- Münch, Richard: *Globale Dynamik, lokale Lebenswelten. Der schwierige Weg in die Weltgesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M., 1998.
- Offe, Claus: *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts*. Frankfurt a.M., New York, 1994. -----: *Varieties of Transition. The East European and East German Experience*. Cambridge, 1996.
- Panagiotou, R. A.: “Estonia’s success: prescription or legacy?” In: *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 34 (2001: 3), 261ff..
- Peters, Bernhard: *Die Integration moderner Gesellschaften*. Frankfurt a. M., 1993.

REFERENCES

Pettai, Iris: "Kihistumine kui probleem. [Social differentiation as the problem.]" In: Raivo Vetik (ed.): *Kaks Eestit. Artiklite, ettekannete ja analüüside kogumik. [Two Estonia's. Collection of articles, presentations, and analyses.]* Tallinn, 2002, 118ff.

"Public memorandum of social scientists." In: national daily *Postimees*, 23 Apr 2001.

Putnam, Robert: *Making Democracy Work. Civic Tradition in Modern Italy.* Princeton, 1993.

-----: *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* New York, 2000.

Roller, Edeltraud, and Wessels, Bernhard: "Contexts of Political Protests in Western Democracies." Band 3. In: Frederik D. Weil (ed.): *Research on Democracy and Society.* Greenwich, Conn., 1998, 91ff.

Rose, Richard: "Post-communism and the problem of trust". In: *Journal of Democracy* (1994:5) 18ff.

-----: *New Baltic Barometer IV: A Survey Study.* Glasgow, 2000.

Ruutsoo, Rein, and Matti Siisiäinen: *Restoring Civil Society in the Baltic States 1988–1994.* Budapest, 1996.

Simmel, Georg: *The Sociology of Georg Simmel.* Ed. Kurt Wolff. Glencoe, Illinois, 1950.

Sztompka, Piotr: „Vertrauen: Die fehlende Ressource in der postkommunistischen Gesellschaft“. In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.* Sonderheft 35, 1995, 254ff.

UNDP: *Estonian Human Development Report 1998.* Tallinn, 1999.

-----: *Estonian Human Development Report 2002.* Tallinn, 2003.

-----: *Estonian Human Development Report 2003.* Tallinn, 2004.

-----: *Human Development Report 2003,* 10 January 2004.

<<http://www.undp.org>>.

Vogelgesang, Jens: *Medienentwicklung, Mediennutzung und soziale Integration in den neuen Bundesländern*. Master thesis. Berlin, 2002.

Weiss, Hans-Jürgen, and Joachim Trebbe: „Haben die Massenmedien einen Einfluss auf die soziale und politische Integration in Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung?“ In: Wolfgang Donsbach, and Olaf Jandura (eds.): *Chancen und Gefahren der Mediendemokratie*. Konstanz, 2003, 399ff.

Welzel, Christian: „Modernisierung and Partizipation.“ In: Dieter Fuchs, Edeltraud Roller und Bernhard Wessels (ed.): *Bürger und Demokratie in Ost und West*. Wiesbaden, 2002, 284ff.

Wolling, Jens: „Skandalberichterstattung in den Medien und die Folgen für die Demokratie.“ In: *Publizistik* 46 (2001:1), 20ff.